"rights of the accused to a speedy trial"

Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial was violated.

Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.

 

"rights of the accused to speedy trial"
Facts
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure. 


Issue
Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case.

Held
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

- means that the states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or class of persons over another.

Tiu v CA   GR No. 127410    1.20.99

F: The passage of RA 7227 (An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion andDevelopment Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes) paved the creation of Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). It includedCity of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval bases Agreement and within the territorial jurisdiction ofthe Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan as secured areas of SSEZ and should, therefore, enjoy the same privileges. Pres. Ramos issued EO 97-A, specifying the areas within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative (only in secured areas consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the completely tax and duty-free area in SSEZ – some of the citizens from areas no longer included in the new delineated areas challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A. According to the citizens, EO 97-A excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.

I: WON the issuance of EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution. And WON the exclusion of some locations from the zone is discriminatory.

R: The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. The fundamental right of equal protection of the law is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.Furthermore, RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.People v Cayat  68 PHIL 12F: Cayat is a member of non-Christian tribe convicted under Act. No. 1639 for possession of an intoxicating liquor and sentenced him to pay P50.00 or subsidiary imprisonment. Cayat assails the decision on the ff. grounds: It is discriminatory, denial of equal protection of the law, violative of due process provided by the constitution, that it is an improper exercise of police power.I: Does Act No. 1639 unconstitutionalR: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty for equal protection of the law is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.

For the classification to be reasonable it must have the ff requisites:

1. must rest on substantial distinction
2. must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. must apply equally to all members of the same class

Due Process of Law defined:

1)      Must rest on substantial distinction

2)      that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government.

3)      That it shall be reasonable in its operation

4)      That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedures prescribed

5)      That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class

      - to constitute due process of law, notice and hearings are not always necessary.

The Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes to remove all obstacles in their intellectual and moral growth. It is meant to mark the non-Christian tribe as inferior or less capable race. When public safety or public moral requires discontinuance of a certain practice by certain classes of persons, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental convenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interest of such member should yield to the paramount interest of the nation.

Arbiter - One who has the power to judge or ordain at will

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v Ignacio M. Capulong   GR No. 82398   4.29.88

F: Petitioner is filming a motion picture about the EDSA Revolution and informed Juan Ponce Enrile about it who opposes the project and filed a temporary restraining order. Petitioner files motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action since the mini-series had not yet been completed. The court allowed the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on the respondent. In his reply, Enrile is invoking his right to privacy.

I: WON the production of the mini-series would be an intrusion to the privacy of Enrile.

R: No, the court held there is nothing in the film that constitutes an unlawful intrusion on the respondent’s life and it could not see any danger such poses into the privacy of respondent. The court held the film is of historical value and involves public domain and is an appropriate subject on freedom of speech and expression. It further cite the fact that Enrile is a public figure and being a part of the film is one of the natural consequence of being such and it is limited only to his character as a public officer and does not extend to his family in general.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v Philippine Blooming Mills          51 SCRA 189

F: petitioners staged a mass demonstration before the Malacanang Palace expressing their grievance against the abuses of the Pasig police. Their employer, herein respondent called for a meeting with the petitioner appealing to go back to work as it could hamper their operation of business and it is against the “no strike, no lockout” clause of their collective bargaining agreement. Petitioners assert they are not performing a strike but an exercise of the laborer’s constitutional right to freedom of expression. A second mtng. was called by respondent to urge the petitioners to report to work otherwise they will be dismissed from work. Petitioners did not grant the request of the respondent who consequently dismissed the officials of petitioners on grounds for violation of their CBA. The court ruled in favor of respondents hence this petition for review.

I: WON there is justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners

R: Workers acted right in the exercise of their freedom to expression. The petitioners explained to the company that such is what they are trying to assert thus it is not violative of their agreement on “no strike, no lockout” rule. The company’s right to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The company’s loss of unrealized profits for the day of the strike is not as important as the workers fight their rights. In fact, they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for that day. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in the denial of a person’s constitutional right, the CIR should not have denied their motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the court divested itself of their jurisdiction which renders their decision in favor of thecompany null and void.The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a morestringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVILWHICH THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT.When a Court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice requires it.

PEOPLE VS. CAYAT 68 PHIL 12 MAY 5, 1939

Facts: Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, was accused for possessing one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Issue: The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of thelaws;(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution;and(3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

R:1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.2. Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.

Due process of law means simply:(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government;(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.Thus a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; orproperty used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the Property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.3. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote, the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity, is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up- and-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and inAmerica . Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine.In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.

Gashem Shookat Baksh v CA   GR No. 97336   2.19.93

F: Petitioner, an exchange student in the Philippines, promised the private respondent to marry her and asked that they will live together. After taking her virginity, the petitioner began to change his behavior and have become violent. He confessed that he is already married to someone else which prompted the private respondent to file a case against petitioner for damages due to breach of promise to marry under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code. The court decided in her favor in the account of the deceitful promise of the petitioner and that the parents of the respondent spent money for the preparation of the marriage. On appeal the CA affirmed lower court decision thus this petition.

I: WON the private respondent may sue under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

R: The court held that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. There was a deliberate omission of the provision that makes it so by the congress but in the interest of justice it incorporates in the Civil Code Art. 23 which provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Article 21 is designed to expand the concepts of torts or quasi-delict and fills the vaccum by adding legal remedy for the untold numbers of moral wrongs without which some injurious acts would be beyond redress. The private respondent therefore may claim for damages not by breach of promise to marry but because of the fraudulent and deceitful act of the petitioner that injures her honor and dignity.

OPERATIVE FACT AND PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS

Operative Facts    -         A fact that is directly relevant to deciding some question of law.  When a legal question is governed by fact-driven rules, operative facts may be thought of as variables that are plugged in to those rules so that the right answer can be obtained.-         Adjudicative facts are fact that is either legally operative or important as to be controlling on some question of law. Adjudicative facts re-create the course of events that led to the dispute and help in determining the proper outcome in the case. They differ from ordinary facts in that they are considered facts only if the court recognizes and accepts them.

Que v People   154 SCRA 160    (1987)

F: Petitioner convicted in violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) filed motion for reconsideration before SC on the following grounds:(1) petition for reconsideration denied by a mere resolution with nothing else but the statement “lack of merit”(2) The lower court has no jurisdiction to try the case.(3) Appelate court erred in considering one of the most impt. Element in the offense against BP 22 which is place of issuance of check which is absent in the instant case.

I: WON the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the Petition for Review are in accordance with law and evidence

.R: The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City

 as admitted by petitioner himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on his civil liability. It is of no moment whether the said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of issuance which is in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction. Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.On denial of resolution by minute resolution, court held that these 'resolutions' are not 'decisions' within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

20th Century Fox v CA  164 SCRA 655  (1988)

F: Petitioner sought the help of the NBI in connection with its anti-piracy campaign alleging that some videotape outlets are engaged in marketing copyrighted films in violation of PD 449 or Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property. A search warrant was issued to the NBI which was later withdrawn by the court upon motion to lift search warrant due to lack of probable cause which was affirmed by the appellate court.

I: WON the court erred in lifting the search warrant due to lack of probable cause.

R: Article 3, section 2 of the Constitution provides that no search warrant shall be issued without probable cause. 

PROBABLE CAUSE is defined as a valid search as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The constitutional provisions demand “no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be justified” to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the search warrant.In the case at bar, the issuance of the warrant was due to the misrepresentation of the NBI that copyright infringements were being committed. There was no probable cause since the agents have no personal knowledge of such fact. Court ordered that the master tapes be presented from which the copyrighted films were allegedly copied for the validity of the issuance of the search warrant since the court could not afford to make any presumption that duplicates were taken from the master copy of the petitioner.Columbia

 Pictures v CA   261 SCRA 144  (1996)

F: Acting upon a formal complaint by the petitioner on violation of PD 449, NBI agents surveillance different video establishments in Metro Manila including the private respondent. A search warrant was secured with affidavits and depositions of the NBI with 2 witnesses. Search and seizure of copyrighted materials were taken by the NBI and a motion to lift search warrant was filed and was denied by the court. On motion for reconsideration, the court upholds the motion to lift on grounds that no original copy of the films were presented when securing the warrant citing the case of 20th Century Fox vs CA. On appeal, the CA sustained the ruling of the trial court.

I: WON the ruling on the cited case applicable in the case at bar.

R: No because rules and decisions must be applied prospectively. The ruling in the cited case is not applicable since the ruling in the case at bar happened before such ruling was ever upheld. The ruling in the 20th Century Fox only serves as a guidepost and not absolute since it is not always necessary to present the original tapes before ascertaining probable cause.

"On finality of decision"
F: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC issued a temporary restraining order for the execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA 8177. Such action by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case.

I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.

R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may transpire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.

LAW OF THE CASE
(Not an absolute law, just a common law)T

he Law of the case is a legal term of art that is applicable mainly incommon law, or Anglo-American, jurisdictions that recognize the related doctrine of stare decisis. The phrase refers to instances where "rulings made by a trial court and not challenged on appeal become the law of the case." [1] "Unless the trial court's rulings were clearly in error or there has been an important change in circumstances, the Court's prior rulings must stand." [2] Usually the situation occurs when either a case is on appeal for the second time--e.g., if the reviewing court remanded the matter back to the trial court and the party appeals again, or the case was appealed to a higher appellate court--for example, from an appellate court to the highest court.As generally used, the term law of the case designates the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.[3]The doctrine provides that an appellate court’s determination on a legal issue is binding on both the trial court on remand and an appellate court on a subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts.[4]Law of the case, however, is one of policy only and will be disregarded when compelling circumstances call for a redetermination of the determination of a point of law on prior appeal, and this is particularly true where an intervening or a contemporaneous change in law has occurred by overruling former decisions or the establishment of new precedent by controlling authority.[5]The law of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration of a previously decided issue unless one of three "exceptional circumstances" exists: (1) when substantially different evidence is raised at a subsequent trial; (2) when a subsequent contrary view of the law is decided by the controlling authority; or (3) when a decision is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.

JM Tuason v Mariano   GR. No. L-33140    10.23.78

F: The case involves the question of validity of ownership of a land title of the petitioners filed by the respondents. A previous civil case was already decided upon by the court upholding the validity of said title owned by the petitioners. The petitioners herein filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition.

I: WON the respondents may still question the validity of said land title.

R: The court held they cannot question an issue that has already been decided by the court in finality. The validity of said title is no longer open for attack as it is against public policy that matters already decided on its merits be re-litigated once again.

Buaya v Stronghold   GR. No, 139020   10.11.00F: Stronghold filed a case against Buaya who is the manager of its Cebu branch for recovery of un-remitted collection of money. The lower court ruled on Stronghold’s favor. Buaya appealed before the CA which ruled in his favor remanding the case back to the lower court. Subsequent hearings were set with failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear many times until Stronghold filed a petition to reinstate the previous decision of the court. The court decision becomes final and executory and it denied all other appeals made before it. Buaya thus herein files a motion for certiorari.

I: (1) Can a decision from the lower court that is annulled by the appellate court be reinstated by the same court that rendered the decision; (2) When the appellate court annuls the decision of the lower court on grounds of failure to give notice to Buaya at pre-trial and remanded it back to the said lower court, does the proceeding in the lower court merely requires presentation of evidence by Buaya alone without requiring Stronghold to present its evidence for cross examination by Buaya.

R: (1) On annulled decision, the court correct that the CA did not annulled the lower court’s decision but merely set aside to allow petitioner to present his evidence. There is nothing wrong when the court reinstated its decision after failure of petitioner to present evidence despite the ample time given for him to do so. It is also required for the petitioner to attach an authentic copy of the original decision to support his claim that the CA annulled the lower court’s decision. Failure to comply said requirement is a ground for dismissal of petition.(2) On final and executory judgment, it becomes the law of the case regardless of claims that it is erroneous. Final judgments are decisions rendered by court with competent jurisdiction acting within its authority and its judgment cannot be altered even at risk of occasional legal infirmities of errors it may contain. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. In view of efficient and effective administration of judgment once a decision has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the favorable judgment rendered upon them on suits involving the same issues and parties.

Argel v Pascua   A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131   8.20.01

F: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, said Judge modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there was no witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ordered the arrest of the accused.

I: WON a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or modification.

R: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless of claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

RES JUDICATA-         the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal.[1]; and the term is also used to refer to the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of such cases between the same parties, which is different between the two legal systems. In this latter usage, the term is synonymous with"preclusion".

Elements of Res Judicata

1. The former judgment must be final
2. Judgment must be on the merits of the case
3. The former decision is rendered by the court having jurisdiction over the subject.
4. There is similar identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action for both cases.

Cause of action - defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."

TEST FOR APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA

In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.

LITIS PENDENTIALitis pendentia: 

"a pending suit." same parties, same cause. Interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court.Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious

Requisites for litis pendentia:(a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res adjudicata in the other.Forum shopping à exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the final other.Doctrine of Estoppel à an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in thePhilippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations.45 The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.

Replivin - A legal action to recover the possession of items of Personal Property.

Agilent Technologies v Integrated Silicon Technology   4.14.04

F: Petitioner Agilent is foreign corporation not licensed to transact business in thePhilippines but engaged services of the defendant Silicon Tech by a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement ("VAASA"). Silicon filed a complaint on "Specific Performance and Damages"  against Agilent in a civil case No. 3110-01-C alleging breach of oral agreement by petitioner to extend their contract for 5 more years. Consequently, Agilent filed a complaint against Silicon on "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages" before the RTC as Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering defendants to immediately return and deliver to plaintiff its equipment, machineries which were left in the plant of Silicon. Silicon filed motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of legal capacity of Agilent to sue, litis pendentia, forum shopping and failure to state cause of action. Such motion was denied by the trial court and granted motion for replevin by the plaintiff. Without filing motion for reconsideration, Silicon filed motion for certiorari to the appellate court. Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C thus this petition for review assailing the decision of the CA.

I: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents’ petition, notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C.

R: CA contends RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary before resort to a petition for certiorari. There is no urgency of the case that merits dispensing the procedure of filing motion for reconsideration before a certiorari may be filed. Respondents availed of premature remedy which the CA should have dismissed outright.Litis pendencia is not appreciated in the case since the instituted actions in both civil cases are different, the first is an action for "Specific Performance and Damages" the other is action for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages." The issues involved are also different: WON there is a breach of oral agreement for renewing theVAASA on the first case while on the second case WON the petitioner has the right to possess the subject properties. In the absence of the requisites of litis pendencia, the court ruled that the trial court is not barred from taking cognizant to both cases.In assailing the legal capacity of Agilent to sue, the court cited the following principles:

he principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts;47 (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction48; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts;49 and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.Two general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered as "doing business" in the Philippines

.1. substance test - whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.2. continuity test - implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization.The court ruled that Agilent categorically is not doing business in the Philippines, hence as a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines

, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts. The court granted the petition of Agilent reversing the CA decision of dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C while granting the petition of Agilent for Writ of Replivin.

Cayana v CA   03.18.04

F: It appears that the petitioners and respondents’ father, with the marital consent of his wife, sold two parcels of land to their son, one of the respondents in this case. At the death of the father, the mother filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claims pertaining to the two parcels of land, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son were forgeries. However, later on, she issued an affidavit withdrawing such adverse claims. Later on, together with petitioners of this case and respondent Marceliano, they filed a case against respondent Pastor, for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of the two parcels of land. Meanwhile, respondent Pastor entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation using second parcel of land; mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank and sold first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who then mortgaged the land to respondent bank.As the civil case against respondents was ongoing, respondents filed an answer but were found to be in default, the court allowed petitioners to file evidence ex parte. The court decided the civil case in favor of petitioners, declaring the deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer for reconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner of the land. No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was deemed final. The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and the bank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it to respondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M.Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos. The petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification and cancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the respondents. They asked also for the possession of the 2 parcels of land due to the alleged donation inter vivos of their mother. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners, part of the decision included the application of res judicata. Respondentsappealed this to the CA contending the misuse of res judicata. CA decided in favor of the respondents. It held that res judicata was inapplicable and also, declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCT’s valid. CA mentioned that it was evident that there was an affidavit withdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of landwere not simulated and not done in bad faith, and that there was no evidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners.

I: Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the second case?

R:Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure:SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.--The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of theperson; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto.

Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment are not applicable to this case since the requisites for these two to apply are not present. There is ‘bar by prior judgment’ when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. 

The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case.The doctrine that should have been followed in this case is conclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.

Urbana Velasco v People’s Homesite (GR NO. L-39674) 01.31.78

“Supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.”"cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."

F: The case at bar involves a parcel of land which the petitioner occupies and built a house thereof. Petitioner filed before the defendant corporation for the award of sale of the said parcel of land and found out that it was already awarded to defendant spouses. Petitioner filed protest before the court for annulment of deed of sale of said lot. Defendant spouses invoke res judicata in their counterclaim stating that the petitioner has no cause for action since there is a decision already to quiet the title and recovery of possession of the Lot

involved in favor of the defendant spouses. The court dismissed the case on ground of res judicata stating that the court decision has already been final and executory. Petitioner appealed before the appellate court which forwarded the case to SC since the issue involved is a question of law.

I: WON res judicata is applicable at the case at bar.

R: No. For res judicata be appreciated in a case, 4 elements must be present: (1) there is a former final judgment; (2) decision rendered by court with proper jurisdiction over the case; (3) judgment must be on merit; (4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between 2 cases. The identity of cause of action is the main issue on the case at bar. The court held that in order to identify whether the second action is of the same cause as the first the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.The first case involves quieting the title and recovery and possession of the land while the second case involves the action for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of the land title. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings.

MUTATIS MUTANDIS 
- Necessary changes
- Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need to be changed" or more simply "the necessary changes having been made". The term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables set at the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ – "all other things being equal" –thereby making comparison easier

ABANDONMENT V REVERSAL

People v Mapa  20 SCRA 1164  (1967)

I: WON the position of a secret agent working for a governor a defense against prosecution from illegal possession of firearms

R: Petitioner relied on the previous ruling of People v Macarandang where the secret agent was acquitted of the same charge where the court ruled that appointment of a secret agent sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace officer. But the court now abandoned such jurisprudence finding no provision from the law that exempts a secret agent from the prohibition of unlawful possession of ammunition and firearms.

Relampagos v Cumba   4.27.95

F: Both parties running are mayoralty candidates with Cumba declared as the winner. Relampagos appealed and the court declared him as a winner, the decision received by both parties on July 1. On July 4 Cumba appeal. On Jul 8 the court referred the case to the Comelec. On July 12, Relampagos filed motion for execution pending appeal which Cumbas opposed but the court granted the appeal. Cumbas filed a petition to the Comelec to annul the grant for execution. In its resolution, the Comelec resolve to declare the court’s grant for execution be lifted by virtue of its authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases provided by B.P. Blg. 697. The said resolution was challenged by the petitioner questioning the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec to decide over the issue.

I: WON Comelec has the appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.

R: The court pointed out that the previous ruling on Garcia v Uy, the comelec was found to have no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction. But the Comelec stated that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction which the court finds to be correct as there is no expressed repeal of the said provision. The court thereby abandons said ruling from the Garcia v Uy.Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner made an appeal after which the court already divested its jurisdiction over the case to the comelec therefore it could no longer validly act upon its motion. (Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal which is 5 days after upon receipt of the court decision. An appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal.)On repeal of a statute:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 

Serrano v NLRC    5.04.00

F: Isettan, respondent in the case files a motion for reconsideration after it was ordered to pay petitioner full backwages from the day of its termination from work until it is determined that he has been terminated for an authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter decision that Serrano was illegally dismissed and ordered to be reinstated was reversed by the NLRC on ground that he was dismissed by “authorized causes” (redundancy) which does not requires the 30 day notice. It is only for reasons of “just cause” that an employee must be issued the notice to give them due process. Serrano petitioned for review, which the court ordered Isettan to pay Serrano full backwages until it is determined whether his termination from service is of authorized cause. Isettan’s arguments include: (1) failure to issue a 30 days written notice to Serrano is not a violation of the labor law since the petitioner accepted their form of notice of giving 30 days pay to their employees in lieu of giving the 30 days notice although the petitioner did not accept the payment; (2) that the 30 day pay is more advantageous than the 30 days notice; (3) in any event the new ruling of this case should be applied prospectively.

I; WON the labor law requirement of giving 30 days notice prior to termination may be offset to giving 30 days pay.

R: Art. 283 of the Labor Code intends that the 30 day notice is mandatory. Nothing in the law gives private respondent the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. Upon the contention of the respondent that the ruling of the case should only be applied prospectively, the court finds no compelling reason not to apply it immediately. Respondent relied on the previous rulings of case in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the new ruling should be applied prospectively and should not be applied on parties who relied on the old doctrine in good faith which is not applicable in this case.

Vitarich v NLRC   5.20.99

F: Vitarich terminated Recodo for failure to comply with the memo issued upon him involving issues on company policies on credit transactions and cash advances. Prior to his termination, the Head of Personnel of the company submitted a report of its investigation finding no just cause to terminate Recodo but Vitarich still terminated Recodo, who filed a case for illegal dismissal against them. The Labor Arbiter finds Recodo was illegally dismissed but his findings were set aside by the NLRC ruling otherwise. Upon appeal of Recodo, the NLRC reversed its decision admitting some flaws on its decision. Vitarich contends that such decision of the NLRC is a grave abuse of its discretionary powers.

I; WON NLRC abused its discretionary power.

R: The court held that with its findings, although there is truth in the delayed implementation of the memo order to Recodo, such delay does not constitutes disobedience to merit the cause of his termination on grounds of loss of trust and confidence of the company upon him. In the name of social justice policy on labor, there must be sufficient grounds that the employer must prove when terminating its employees. This very norm of social justice demands the presumption of good faith credited to the employees in the performance of their duties upon failure of their employer to prove just cause for their dismissal. It is in obedience of this social policy mandate that the NLRC finds itself bound to reverse its first decision. Court re-affirmed the NLRC decision.

Astraquillo v Javier  13 SCRA 125   (1965)

F: The trial court decide in favor of the respondent declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordered the petitioners to pay respondents with unpaid rentals and damages. On appeal by the petitioners, it was assailed by the respondent that it is incomplete and defective thus the court said to wait until the appeal is perfected. For the meantime respondent moved for the writ of execution pending appeal due to the insolvency of the petitioners. The trial court granted the writ of execution which the petitioners appealed before the CA by petition for certiorari. CA ruled in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal of the respondent it reversed its decision upholding the decision of the CA. Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of CA on reversing its decision when the respondents did not raised any new issues to make it reverse its decision.

I: WON the CA erred in reversing its decision

R: No. it did not err in its decision to uphold the writ of execution pending appeal in court. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides the discretionary power of the trial court to grant or deny a motion ad the appellate courts will not interfere or modify or control such discretion unless there is an abuse thereof. The trial court has found the substantial claim in the case at bar and the appellate court affirmed this in its disputed resolution. There is no merit on the contention of the petitioner that the CA lacks substantial reason to reverse its decision. Courts have the power to amend and control its orders and processes to make them conform to law and justice. The SC finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA to uphold the writ of execution decided upon by the lower court.

Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools   219 SCRA 256

F: Petitioners are children who were expelled by the respondent from school on grounds for refusal to participate in the flag ceremony in violation of RA 1265 penalizing educational institution that refuses to perform flag ceremony. Petitioners belong to the sect of Jehova’s witness and participating to the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge is against their religious belief as it amounts to idolatry. Respondent contends that his action is in accordance with the Gerona

 case where the court upholds that the flag is a symbol of the RP that symbolizes its sovereignty, freedom and liberty which does not involve any religious ceremony and that the determination of certain ritual is religious or not rests upon the court to decide.

I: WON the expulsion of the children from school is valid.

R: No, since the Gerona case was re-examined by the court and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag ceremony undermines one’s constitutional rights specifically the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.

The court cites the 2 fold aspect of religious freedom namely:
1.       The absolute freedom to believe within the realm of thoughts
2.       the freedom to act on one’s belief which may be regulatedIt underscores that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger , both grave and imminent which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the court held there is no clear and present danger to society with the refusal of the petitioner’s children to participate in the flag ceremony.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

The court’s authority to examine executive or legislative act and invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional principles.-         the doctrine under which legislative and executive actions are subject to review, and possible invalidation, by the judiciary.-     A court's authority to examine an executive or legislative act and to invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional principles.

JURISDICTION

The practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to apolitical leader to deal with and make pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility. Authority to hear and determine cause of action. The geographic area over which authority extends; legal authority; the authority to hear and determine causes of action

Herrera v Barretto  25 PHIL 245   9.10.13

F: The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity of the Caloocan Municipal President revoked to operate. Respondent judge apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion for certiorari before the higher court against the respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing the mandatory injunction of provisional license.

I: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar.

R: No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in a case all decisions exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court held that the CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all matters arising in question.Court held that 

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.

Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how irregular or erroneous it is.

People v Mariano   GR No. L-40527

F: Accused, a liaison officer of the Province of Bulacan, is charged with estafa in the amount of less than P6,000.00. He filed a motion to quash the information on the account that the court has no jurisdiction over the case since the military commission already ruled on his malversation case involving the same subject matter.

I: WON the court has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

R: The court ruled that estafa and malversation constitute different offense. The CFI has original jurisdiction over the case of estafa citing the Judicial Act of 1948 (CFI shall have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving a penalty of imprisonment for more than 6 months or a fine of P200.00)