SEPARATION OF POWERS

Francisco v HRET   11.10.03

“2 impeachment cases filed against Chief Justice Davide within a period of 1 year”

RULING: The court declared the proceeding to be unconstitutional. Article XI of the Constitution provides that no public official be subject for impeachment twice within a period of 1 year. While the Congress contends that the S.C. has no power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings against Davide by virtue of separation of powers where the Congress has the sole jurisdiction to initiate and hear impeachment proceedings, the court declared it is empowered by the Constitution to exercise judicial review with the duty vested upon it to check whether there is grave abuse of discretion on any branch of the government. The SC has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and to answer involving Constitutional issues. The SC is not bar to inquire about any actions of the Congress especially involving Constitutional issues.

David v Macapagal-Arroyo  GR. No. 171396   5.3.06

F: The President issued Proclamation No. 1017 declaring national emergency and placing the AFP under her command to maintain law and order in the Phils., suppress all forms of lawless violence, and enforce obedience to all the laws, order, decree promulgated by her or in her direction. Such proclamation was assailed as unconstitutional and a form of encroachment upon the powers of the legislative department.

I: WON the Presidential Proclamation is unconstitutional

R: The court held that the Constitution grants the President the power to call the AFP to suppress lawless violence and during times of calamity being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. However, the provision asserting her power to issue decrees, direct AFP to enforce obedience to ALL laws she promulgate, impose standard of media and other forms of restraints against the press are unconstitutional, all of which is the exercise of the legislative department.

JUDGESLAWYERS
“fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients”

Regala v Sandiganbayan   GR. No. 105938  9.20.96

F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.

I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege information)

R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship with their client.

As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1. The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.
3. Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
4. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.

EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:

1. Strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)
3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyer’s client unless by revealing the client’s name it would provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (present in this case)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)
5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential.

Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

STARE DECISIS-         “let the decision stand”-         The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases.-         The principle of stare decisis was not always applied with uniform strictness. the principle of stare decisis has always been tempered with a conviction that prior decisions must comport with notions of good reason or they can be overruled by the highest court in the jurisdiction.

Tala Realty v Banco Pilipinas    6.20.00
“disagreement between parties on which lease contract should prevail”

RULING: It is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the same questions relating to similarly situated conditions which the court already litigated abd decided upon and the rule on stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate the same issue (“stare decisis et non quieta movere” – follow past precedents and do not disturb what has already been settled.) Stare decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the same even if the parties may be different.

El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida   9.18..47

F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established.

I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar

R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found out that a previous judgment was erroneous.

F: Petitioners are dual citizens (by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship) who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The Comelec denies on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Constitution.

I: WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement.

R: Court held that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in thePhilippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Since it is by basic knowledge that duals are likely to be non-residents, RA 9189 aims to enfranchise as much as possible OFW the qualification to vote as court ruling in the case of Macalintal. Furthermore, by the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines  may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re‑acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

F: The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent after it fails to include him among the employees who signify their willingness to be absorbed by the company after its announcement for retrenchment of their workers on ground of redundancy. Apparently, respondent gave their employees the choice to opt to avail of the early retirement package they offer or for re-deployment to its other sales offices. The petitioner chose to be absorbed but was included in the list among those who want to avail of the retirement package. Despite his manifestation of his willingness to be demoted to any position as long as the company retain him for employment he was still dismissed from work. The labor arbiter dismissed his complaint due to lack of merit and on appeal the decision was set aside by the NLRC which ordered respondent to reinstate petitioner with payment of backwages. The respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the judgment of the labor arbiter. Thus, this petition before the SC.

I: WON there is an illegal dismissal of the petitioner from employment.

R: The court held that based from Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, the nature of redundancy is an authorized cause for dismissal wherein there is duplication of work of employees. It is upon the judgment of the employer to determine whether an employee’s services are sustainable and properly terminable. However, the employer should declare redundancy with a just cause and in good faith. The court noted that the respondent was adamant from the request of the petitioner to be retained despite his willingness to be demoted in position while the same request of other employees was granted. The warehouse which respondent claims to close remains to be in operation. The respondent also did not establish criteria in dismissing the petitioner and the court gave weight to the petitioner’s predicament that his dismissal may be related to his expose on some irregularities of transaction involving their manager. The court upholds the right of every worker for security of tenure thus due to failure of the respondent to give justifiable cause for dismissing petitioner, the decision of the CA was set aside and reinstated the decision of the NLRC, ordering reinstatement of the petitioner with full backwages .

F: The case involves a collection of sum of money by the petitioner from the respondent by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking where petitioner stands as a guarantor to the credit accommodation provided by PNB to respondent which upon failure of the respondent to pay the PNB, the petitioner was made to pay by the bank on behalf of the respondent. Upon filing of the complaint to collect the said money, respondent files a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action on the part of the petitioner since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or penalty because of the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent. Subsequently petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence and the motion to amend resulted to the dismissal of the case on the on the ground of failure to state a cause of action by RTC decision. The CA denied the motion to set aside the decision of RTC and its motion for reconsideration.

I: WON the complaint be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.

R:.Although the complaint did not allege that the petitioner sustained some actual loss, the complaint of the petitioner emanates from the obligation of the respondent to indemnify the petitioner once it fails to comply with paying its creditors by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking. Respondents’ obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents

F: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.

I: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.

R: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v Martinez

 where it was held that BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It is not the non-payment of debt or obligation which the law punishes and the law does not coerce the debtor to pay debt but the main objective of the law is the prohibition and penalizing the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is against public order.

F: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution disqualifying him as congressional candidate of Davao Del Sur and for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified upon the petition of his rival candidate for disqualification on grounds of his previous conviction in violation of BP 22 (bouncing check law) which constitutes moral turpitude, a ground for disqualification for electoral candidacy under the Omnibus Election Code.

I: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a disqualification for electoral candidacy.

R: A violation of BP 22 involves the following elements:

1. Accused makes, draws, issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. Accused knows at the time of the issuance that there is no sufficient fund on the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment.
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.

The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe Tuanda where conviction for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral character of a person.

F: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

I: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.

R: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport. 
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made: 
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

F: Appellant is the successor of interest in behalf of the late Severino Domingo who has a case against Ongsiako. It took 20 years before he came to know about the decision of the case, prompting him to file a complaint for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion of the case and asserting erroneous decision of the court. The same was dismissed by the court due to lack of merit and without cause of action.


I: (1) WON an action for the enforcement of a dissenting opinion may be filed before the court.   (2) WON the court should act before the complaint on erroneous decision of the court.


R: (1) No because a dissenting opinion merits no right or claim as it is just merely a dissent from the majority decision of the case.(2) Appellant is barred from assailing the decision of the court by res judicata and the decision has already been final and executory already.