F: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

I: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.

R: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport. 
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made: 
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

F: Appellant is the successor of interest in behalf of the late Severino Domingo who has a case against Ongsiako. It took 20 years before he came to know about the decision of the case, prompting him to file a complaint for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion of the case and asserting erroneous decision of the court. The same was dismissed by the court due to lack of merit and without cause of action.


I: (1) WON an action for the enforcement of a dissenting opinion may be filed before the court.   (2) WON the court should act before the complaint on erroneous decision of the court.


R: (1) No because a dissenting opinion merits no right or claim as it is just merely a dissent from the majority decision of the case.(2) Appellant is barred from assailing the decision of the court by res judicata and the decision has already been final and executory already.

F: The case at bar is a question on the validity of the search warrant and arrest of the petitioner charged for the crime of rebellion. The CA decision holds the search warrant as null and void but the articles seized shall be retained. Petitioners contend that a lawful search would only be justified by a lawful arrest therefore with the court ruling that the arrest was illegal the articles seized should also be returned to them. Respondents assert that although the search warrant was null and void the arrest was not.

I: WON the personalities that were seized by an illegal search warrant should be returned.

R: Yes, it should be returned. The court used the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee invoking the Constitutional provision from the Bill of Rights that mandates the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of this Constitutional mandate shall be inadmissible for any purpose or proceedings.

F: The petitioner’s laundrywoman filed an administrative complaint against the respondent who alleged that the petitioner is using the laundrywoman in retaliation for the charges filed by the respondent against petitioner. The case was dismissed by the court. The petitioner filed a case of libel against the respondent which was likewise dismissed. The petitioner again filed for damages based on the information in the case of libel which the court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. On one hand, Ucol files an appeal for certiorari questioning the dissenting opinion of the CA.

I: WON an appeal may be filed questioning a court’s dissenting opinion.

R: It would be elementary to know that a dissenting opinion is not the decision of the case. What is subject to appeal or a special civil action would be the majority opinion of the court.

Declaratory relief - should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.

The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.17

Justiciable Controversy - refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.

Legal Standing/Locus Standi – personal or substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of an act.

Relief – specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the right of a plaintiff or petitioner.

Cause of Action - is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Failure of complaint to state cause of action is ground for outright dismissal.

Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

Essential Parts of A Good Decision:

1. Statement of the case
2. Statement of the facts
3. Issues or Assignments of Errors
4. Court’s ruling
5. Dispositive portion

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court:1.  Dismissal of cases without allegations:

F: Respondent judge issued an order for a writ of execution of absolute sale to the petitioner in favor of the plaintiff but herein petitioner contested the decision asserting that the decision that should be executed is the one stated in the decretal or dispositive portion of the case.

I: WON judgment can only be found in the decretal portion of the decision.

R: Ordinarily, the decision of the case is found in the dispositive portion but there are instances that the ruling is embodied in other parts of the case as the writing style of the ponente will vary and is personal in nature. The court cannot implement a stringent rule as to how the ponente may write a decision as long as they do not violate the Rules of Court.

F: Respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner for refusal to pay the increased rental of their lot. Petitioner filed motion to dismiss which was denied by the court ordering suspension of the proceeding for 2 years. Upon issuance of court of the date to set the hearing, the petitioner files a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. Thus they file motion for certiorari and prohibition before the CFI. Responded argued that such motion is improper since the court merely issued an interlocutory order and cannot be subjected for review by certiorari and asserts that the case should be heard.

I: WON there is merit for filing petition for certiorari in this case

R: No, there is no merit for filing a motion for certiorari in this case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court merely an interlocutory order which did not provide a definite resolution on the case. The lower court should hear the case and has the power to re-open the case for trial to determine the rights of the parties involved for the final resolution of the case.

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike. Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.          

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,subject to any legislation that  may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “governmentemployees” and that the SSS is  one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and the basis of the lower court’s conviction to the accused was based on their alleged extrajudicial confessions.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on their extrajudicial confession

Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing.
The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. “Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.” Thus, because of these defects in observing the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.

Facts: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.


Section 15(a) of the resolution provides: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda: (a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.


Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:


Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.



Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."


Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. Held: -The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. 


Held: The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.