MUTATIS MUTANDIS 
- Necessary changes
- Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need to be changed" or more simply "the necessary changes having been made". The term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables set at the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ – "all other things being equal" –thereby making comparison easier

ABANDONMENT V REVERSAL

People v Mapa  20 SCRA 1164  (1967)

I: WON the position of a secret agent working for a governor a defense against prosecution from illegal possession of firearms

R: Petitioner relied on the previous ruling of People v Macarandang where the secret agent was acquitted of the same charge where the court ruled that appointment of a secret agent sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace officer. But the court now abandoned such jurisprudence finding no provision from the law that exempts a secret agent from the prohibition of unlawful possession of ammunition and firearms.

Relampagos v Cumba   4.27.95

F: Both parties running are mayoralty candidates with Cumba declared as the winner. Relampagos appealed and the court declared him as a winner, the decision received by both parties on July 1. On July 4 Cumba appeal. On Jul 8 the court referred the case to the Comelec. On July 12, Relampagos filed motion for execution pending appeal which Cumbas opposed but the court granted the appeal. Cumbas filed a petition to the Comelec to annul the grant for execution. In its resolution, the Comelec resolve to declare the court’s grant for execution be lifted by virtue of its authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases provided by B.P. Blg. 697. The said resolution was challenged by the petitioner questioning the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec to decide over the issue.

I: WON Comelec has the appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.

R: The court pointed out that the previous ruling on Garcia v Uy, the comelec was found to have no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction. But the Comelec stated that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction which the court finds to be correct as there is no expressed repeal of the said provision. The court thereby abandons said ruling from the Garcia v Uy.Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner made an appeal after which the court already divested its jurisdiction over the case to the comelec therefore it could no longer validly act upon its motion. (Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal which is 5 days after upon receipt of the court decision. An appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal.)On repeal of a statute:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 

Serrano v NLRC    5.04.00

F: Isettan, respondent in the case files a motion for reconsideration after it was ordered to pay petitioner full backwages from the day of its termination from work until it is determined that he has been terminated for an authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter decision that Serrano was illegally dismissed and ordered to be reinstated was reversed by the NLRC on ground that he was dismissed by “authorized causes” (redundancy) which does not requires the 30 day notice. It is only for reasons of “just cause” that an employee must be issued the notice to give them due process. Serrano petitioned for review, which the court ordered Isettan to pay Serrano full backwages until it is determined whether his termination from service is of authorized cause. Isettan’s arguments include: (1) failure to issue a 30 days written notice to Serrano is not a violation of the labor law since the petitioner accepted their form of notice of giving 30 days pay to their employees in lieu of giving the 30 days notice although the petitioner did not accept the payment; (2) that the 30 day pay is more advantageous than the 30 days notice; (3) in any event the new ruling of this case should be applied prospectively.

I; WON the labor law requirement of giving 30 days notice prior to termination may be offset to giving 30 days pay.

R: Art. 283 of the Labor Code intends that the 30 day notice is mandatory. Nothing in the law gives private respondent the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. Upon the contention of the respondent that the ruling of the case should only be applied prospectively, the court finds no compelling reason not to apply it immediately. Respondent relied on the previous rulings of case in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the new ruling should be applied prospectively and should not be applied on parties who relied on the old doctrine in good faith which is not applicable in this case.

Vitarich v NLRC   5.20.99

F: Vitarich terminated Recodo for failure to comply with the memo issued upon him involving issues on company policies on credit transactions and cash advances. Prior to his termination, the Head of Personnel of the company submitted a report of its investigation finding no just cause to terminate Recodo but Vitarich still terminated Recodo, who filed a case for illegal dismissal against them. The Labor Arbiter finds Recodo was illegally dismissed but his findings were set aside by the NLRC ruling otherwise. Upon appeal of Recodo, the NLRC reversed its decision admitting some flaws on its decision. Vitarich contends that such decision of the NLRC is a grave abuse of its discretionary powers.

I; WON NLRC abused its discretionary power.

R: The court held that with its findings, although there is truth in the delayed implementation of the memo order to Recodo, such delay does not constitutes disobedience to merit the cause of his termination on grounds of loss of trust and confidence of the company upon him. In the name of social justice policy on labor, there must be sufficient grounds that the employer must prove when terminating its employees. This very norm of social justice demands the presumption of good faith credited to the employees in the performance of their duties upon failure of their employer to prove just cause for their dismissal. It is in obedience of this social policy mandate that the NLRC finds itself bound to reverse its first decision. Court re-affirmed the NLRC decision.

Astraquillo v Javier  13 SCRA 125   (1965)

F: The trial court decide in favor of the respondent declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordered the petitioners to pay respondents with unpaid rentals and damages. On appeal by the petitioners, it was assailed by the respondent that it is incomplete and defective thus the court said to wait until the appeal is perfected. For the meantime respondent moved for the writ of execution pending appeal due to the insolvency of the petitioners. The trial court granted the writ of execution which the petitioners appealed before the CA by petition for certiorari. CA ruled in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal of the respondent it reversed its decision upholding the decision of the CA. Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of CA on reversing its decision when the respondents did not raised any new issues to make it reverse its decision.

I: WON the CA erred in reversing its decision

R: No. it did not err in its decision to uphold the writ of execution pending appeal in court. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides the discretionary power of the trial court to grant or deny a motion ad the appellate courts will not interfere or modify or control such discretion unless there is an abuse thereof. The trial court has found the substantial claim in the case at bar and the appellate court affirmed this in its disputed resolution. There is no merit on the contention of the petitioner that the CA lacks substantial reason to reverse its decision. Courts have the power to amend and control its orders and processes to make them conform to law and justice. The SC finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA to uphold the writ of execution decided upon by the lower court.

Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools   219 SCRA 256

F: Petitioners are children who were expelled by the respondent from school on grounds for refusal to participate in the flag ceremony in violation of RA 1265 penalizing educational institution that refuses to perform flag ceremony. Petitioners belong to the sect of Jehova’s witness and participating to the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge is against their religious belief as it amounts to idolatry. Respondent contends that his action is in accordance with the Gerona

 case where the court upholds that the flag is a symbol of the RP that symbolizes its sovereignty, freedom and liberty which does not involve any religious ceremony and that the determination of certain ritual is religious or not rests upon the court to decide.

I: WON the expulsion of the children from school is valid.

R: No, since the Gerona case was re-examined by the court and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag ceremony undermines one’s constitutional rights specifically the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.

The court cites the 2 fold aspect of religious freedom namely:
1.       The absolute freedom to believe within the realm of thoughts
2.       the freedom to act on one’s belief which may be regulatedIt underscores that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger , both grave and imminent which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the court held there is no clear and present danger to society with the refusal of the petitioner’s children to participate in the flag ceremony.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

The court’s authority to examine executive or legislative act and invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional principles.-         the doctrine under which legislative and executive actions are subject to review, and possible invalidation, by the judiciary.-     A court's authority to examine an executive or legislative act and to invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional principles.

JURISDICTION

The practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to apolitical leader to deal with and make pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility. Authority to hear and determine cause of action. The geographic area over which authority extends; legal authority; the authority to hear and determine causes of action

Herrera v Barretto  25 PHIL 245   9.10.13

F: The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity of the Caloocan Municipal President revoked to operate. Respondent judge apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion for certiorari before the higher court against the respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing the mandatory injunction of provisional license.

I: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar.

R: No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in a case all decisions exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court held that the CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all matters arising in question.Court held that 

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.

Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how irregular or erroneous it is.

People v Mariano   GR No. L-40527

F: Accused, a liaison officer of the Province of Bulacan, is charged with estafa in the amount of less than P6,000.00. He filed a motion to quash the information on the account that the court has no jurisdiction over the case since the military commission already ruled on his malversation case involving the same subject matter.

I: WON the court has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

R: The court ruled that estafa and malversation constitute different offense. The CFI has original jurisdiction over the case of estafa citing the Judicial Act of 1948 (CFI shall have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving a penalty of imprisonment for more than 6 months or a fine of P200.00)

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Francisco v HRET   11.10.03

“2 impeachment cases filed against Chief Justice Davide within a period of 1 year”

RULING: The court declared the proceeding to be unconstitutional. Article XI of the Constitution provides that no public official be subject for impeachment twice within a period of 1 year. While the Congress contends that the S.C. has no power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings against Davide by virtue of separation of powers where the Congress has the sole jurisdiction to initiate and hear impeachment proceedings, the court declared it is empowered by the Constitution to exercise judicial review with the duty vested upon it to check whether there is grave abuse of discretion on any branch of the government. The SC has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and to answer involving Constitutional issues. The SC is not bar to inquire about any actions of the Congress especially involving Constitutional issues.

David v Macapagal-Arroyo  GR. No. 171396   5.3.06

F: The President issued Proclamation No. 1017 declaring national emergency and placing the AFP under her command to maintain law and order in the Phils., suppress all forms of lawless violence, and enforce obedience to all the laws, order, decree promulgated by her or in her direction. Such proclamation was assailed as unconstitutional and a form of encroachment upon the powers of the legislative department.

I: WON the Presidential Proclamation is unconstitutional

R: The court held that the Constitution grants the President the power to call the AFP to suppress lawless violence and during times of calamity being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. However, the provision asserting her power to issue decrees, direct AFP to enforce obedience to ALL laws she promulgate, impose standard of media and other forms of restraints against the press are unconstitutional, all of which is the exercise of the legislative department.

JUDGESLAWYERS
“fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients”

Regala v Sandiganbayan   GR. No. 105938  9.20.96

F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.

I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege information)

R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship with their client.

As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1. The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.
3. Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
4. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.

EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:

1. Strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)
3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyer’s client unless by revealing the client’s name it would provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (present in this case)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)
5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential.

Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

STARE DECISIS-         “let the decision stand”-         The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases.-         The principle of stare decisis was not always applied with uniform strictness. the principle of stare decisis has always been tempered with a conviction that prior decisions must comport with notions of good reason or they can be overruled by the highest court in the jurisdiction.

Tala Realty v Banco Pilipinas    6.20.00
“disagreement between parties on which lease contract should prevail”

RULING: It is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the same questions relating to similarly situated conditions which the court already litigated abd decided upon and the rule on stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate the same issue (“stare decisis et non quieta movere” – follow past precedents and do not disturb what has already been settled.) Stare decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the same even if the parties may be different.

El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida   9.18..47

F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established.

I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar

R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found out that a previous judgment was erroneous.

F: Petitioners are dual citizens (by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship) who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The Comelec denies on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Constitution.

I: WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement.

R: Court held that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in thePhilippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Since it is by basic knowledge that duals are likely to be non-residents, RA 9189 aims to enfranchise as much as possible OFW the qualification to vote as court ruling in the case of Macalintal. Furthermore, by the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines  may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re‑acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

F: The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent after it fails to include him among the employees who signify their willingness to be absorbed by the company after its announcement for retrenchment of their workers on ground of redundancy. Apparently, respondent gave their employees the choice to opt to avail of the early retirement package they offer or for re-deployment to its other sales offices. The petitioner chose to be absorbed but was included in the list among those who want to avail of the retirement package. Despite his manifestation of his willingness to be demoted to any position as long as the company retain him for employment he was still dismissed from work. The labor arbiter dismissed his complaint due to lack of merit and on appeal the decision was set aside by the NLRC which ordered respondent to reinstate petitioner with payment of backwages. The respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the judgment of the labor arbiter. Thus, this petition before the SC.

I: WON there is an illegal dismissal of the petitioner from employment.

R: The court held that based from Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, the nature of redundancy is an authorized cause for dismissal wherein there is duplication of work of employees. It is upon the judgment of the employer to determine whether an employee’s services are sustainable and properly terminable. However, the employer should declare redundancy with a just cause and in good faith. The court noted that the respondent was adamant from the request of the petitioner to be retained despite his willingness to be demoted in position while the same request of other employees was granted. The warehouse which respondent claims to close remains to be in operation. The respondent also did not establish criteria in dismissing the petitioner and the court gave weight to the petitioner’s predicament that his dismissal may be related to his expose on some irregularities of transaction involving their manager. The court upholds the right of every worker for security of tenure thus due to failure of the respondent to give justifiable cause for dismissing petitioner, the decision of the CA was set aside and reinstated the decision of the NLRC, ordering reinstatement of the petitioner with full backwages .

F: The case involves a collection of sum of money by the petitioner from the respondent by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking where petitioner stands as a guarantor to the credit accommodation provided by PNB to respondent which upon failure of the respondent to pay the PNB, the petitioner was made to pay by the bank on behalf of the respondent. Upon filing of the complaint to collect the said money, respondent files a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action on the part of the petitioner since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or penalty because of the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent. Subsequently petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence and the motion to amend resulted to the dismissal of the case on the on the ground of failure to state a cause of action by RTC decision. The CA denied the motion to set aside the decision of RTC and its motion for reconsideration.

I: WON the complaint be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.

R:.Although the complaint did not allege that the petitioner sustained some actual loss, the complaint of the petitioner emanates from the obligation of the respondent to indemnify the petitioner once it fails to comply with paying its creditors by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking. Respondents’ obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents

F: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.

I: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.

R: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v Martinez

 where it was held that BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It is not the non-payment of debt or obligation which the law punishes and the law does not coerce the debtor to pay debt but the main objective of the law is the prohibition and penalizing the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is against public order.

F: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution disqualifying him as congressional candidate of Davao Del Sur and for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified upon the petition of his rival candidate for disqualification on grounds of his previous conviction in violation of BP 22 (bouncing check law) which constitutes moral turpitude, a ground for disqualification for electoral candidacy under the Omnibus Election Code.

I: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a disqualification for electoral candidacy.

R: A violation of BP 22 involves the following elements:

1. Accused makes, draws, issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. Accused knows at the time of the issuance that there is no sufficient fund on the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment.
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.

The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe Tuanda where conviction for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral character of a person.