MUTATIS MUTANDIS
- Necessary changes
- Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need to be changed" or more simply "the necessary changes having been made". The term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables set at the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ – "all other things being equal" –thereby making comparison easier
ABANDONMENT V REVERSAL
People v Mapa 20 SCRA 1164 (1967)
I: WON the position of a secret agent working for a governor a defense against prosecution from illegal possession of firearms
R: Petitioner relied on the previous ruling of People v Macarandang where the secret agent was acquitted of the same charge where the court ruled that appointment of a secret agent sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace officer. But the court now abandoned such jurisprudence finding no provision from the law that exempts a secret agent from the prohibition of unlawful possession of ammunition and firearms.
Relampagos v Cumba 4.27.95
F: Both parties running are mayoralty candidates with Cumba declared as the winner. Relampagos appealed and the court declared him as a winner, the decision received by both parties on July 1. On July 4 Cumba appeal. On Jul 8 the court referred the case to the Comelec. On July 12, Relampagos filed motion for execution pending appeal which Cumbas opposed but the court granted the appeal. Cumbas filed a petition to the Comelec to annul the grant for execution. In its resolution, the Comelec resolve to declare the court’s grant for execution be lifted by virtue of its authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases provided by B.P. Blg. 697. The said resolution was challenged by the petitioner questioning the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec to decide over the issue.
I: WON Comelec has the appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.
R: The court pointed out that the previous ruling on Garcia v Uy, the comelec was found to have no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction. But the Comelec stated that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction which the court finds to be correct as there is no expressed repeal of the said provision. The court thereby abandons said ruling from the Garcia v Uy.Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner made an appeal after which the court already divested its jurisdiction over the case to the comelec therefore it could no longer validly act upon its motion. (Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal which is 5 days after upon receipt of the court decision. An appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal.)On repeal of a statute:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly.
Serrano v NLRC 5.04.00
F: Isettan, respondent in the case files a motion for reconsideration after it was ordered to pay petitioner full backwages from the day of its termination from work until it is determined that he has been terminated for an authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter decision that Serrano was illegally dismissed and ordered to be reinstated was reversed by the NLRC on ground that he was dismissed by “authorized causes” (redundancy) which does not requires the 30 day notice. It is only for reasons of “just cause” that an employee must be issued the notice to give them due process. Serrano petitioned for review, which the court ordered Isettan to pay Serrano full backwages until it is determined whether his termination from service is of authorized cause. Isettan’s arguments include: (1) failure to issue a 30 days written notice to Serrano is not a violation of the labor law since the petitioner accepted their form of notice of giving 30 days pay to their employees in lieu of giving the 30 days notice although the petitioner did not accept the payment; (2) that the 30 day pay is more advantageous than the 30 days notice; (3) in any event the new ruling of this case should be applied prospectively.
I; WON the labor law requirement of giving 30 days notice prior to termination may be offset to giving 30 days pay.
R: Art. 283 of the Labor Code intends that the 30 day notice is mandatory. Nothing in the law gives private respondent the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. Upon the contention of the respondent that the ruling of the case should only be applied prospectively, the court finds no compelling reason not to apply it immediately. Respondent relied on the previous rulings of case in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the new ruling should be applied prospectively and should not be applied on parties who relied on the old doctrine in good faith which is not applicable in this case.
Vitarich v NLRC 5.20.99
F: Vitarich terminated Recodo for failure to comply with the memo issued upon him involving issues on company policies on credit transactions and cash advances. Prior to his termination, the Head of Personnel of the company submitted a report of its investigation finding no just cause to terminate Recodo but Vitarich still terminated Recodo, who filed a case for illegal dismissal against them. The Labor Arbiter finds Recodo was illegally dismissed but his findings were set aside by the NLRC ruling otherwise. Upon appeal of Recodo, the NLRC reversed its decision admitting some flaws on its decision. Vitarich contends that such decision of the NLRC is a grave abuse of its discretionary powers.
I; WON NLRC abused its discretionary power.
R: The court held that with its findings, although there is truth in the delayed implementation of the memo order to Recodo, such delay does not constitutes disobedience to merit the cause of his termination on grounds of loss of trust and confidence of the company upon him. In the name of social justice policy on labor, there must be sufficient grounds that the employer must prove when terminating its employees. This very norm of social justice demands the presumption of good faith credited to the employees in the performance of their duties upon failure of their employer to prove just cause for their dismissal. It is in obedience of this social policy mandate that the NLRC finds itself bound to reverse its first decision. Court re-affirmed the NLRC decision.
Astraquillo v Javier 13 SCRA 125 (1965)
F: The trial court decide in favor of the respondent declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordered the petitioners to pay respondents with unpaid rentals and damages. On appeal by the petitioners, it was assailed by the respondent that it is incomplete and defective thus the court said to wait until the appeal is perfected. For the meantime respondent moved for the writ of execution pending appeal due to the insolvency of the petitioners. The trial court granted the writ of execution which the petitioners appealed before the CA by petition for certiorari. CA ruled in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal of the respondent it reversed its decision upholding the decision of the CA. Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of CA on reversing its decision when the respondents did not raised any new issues to make it reverse its decision.
I: WON the CA erred in reversing its decision
R: No. it did not err in its decision to uphold the writ of execution pending appeal in court. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides the discretionary power of the trial court to grant or deny a motion ad the appellate courts will not interfere or modify or control such discretion unless there is an abuse thereof. The trial court has found the substantial claim in the case at bar and the appellate court affirmed this in its disputed resolution. There is no merit on the contention of the petitioner that the CA lacks substantial reason to reverse its decision. Courts have the power to amend and control its orders and processes to make them conform to law and justice. The SC finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA to uphold the writ of execution decided upon by the lower court.
Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools 219 SCRA 256
F: Petitioners are children who were expelled by the respondent from school on grounds for refusal to participate in the flag ceremony in violation of RA 1265 penalizing educational institution that refuses to perform flag ceremony. Petitioners belong to the sect of Jehova’s witness and participating to the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge is against their religious belief as it amounts to idolatry. Respondent contends that his action is in accordance with the Gerona
case where the court upholds that the flag is a symbol of the RP that symbolizes its sovereignty, freedom and liberty which does not involve any religious ceremony and that the determination of certain ritual is religious or not rests upon the court to decide.
I: WON the expulsion of the children from school is valid.
R: No, since the Gerona case was re-examined by the court and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag ceremony undermines one’s constitutional rights specifically the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.
The court cites the 2 fold aspect of religious freedom namely:
1. The absolute freedom to believe within the realm of thoughts
2. the freedom to act on one’s belief which may be regulatedIt underscores that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger , both grave and imminent which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the court held there is no clear and present danger to society with the refusal of the petitioner’s children to participate in the flag ceremony.
- Necessary changes
- Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need to be changed" or more simply "the necessary changes having been made". The term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables set at the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ – "all other things being equal" –thereby making comparison easier
ABANDONMENT V REVERSAL
People v Mapa 20 SCRA 1164 (1967)
I: WON the position of a secret agent working for a governor a defense against prosecution from illegal possession of firearms
R: Petitioner relied on the previous ruling of People v Macarandang where the secret agent was acquitted of the same charge where the court ruled that appointment of a secret agent sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace officer. But the court now abandoned such jurisprudence finding no provision from the law that exempts a secret agent from the prohibition of unlawful possession of ammunition and firearms.
Relampagos v Cumba 4.27.95
F: Both parties running are mayoralty candidates with Cumba declared as the winner. Relampagos appealed and the court declared him as a winner, the decision received by both parties on July 1. On July 4 Cumba appeal. On Jul 8 the court referred the case to the Comelec. On July 12, Relampagos filed motion for execution pending appeal which Cumbas opposed but the court granted the appeal. Cumbas filed a petition to the Comelec to annul the grant for execution. In its resolution, the Comelec resolve to declare the court’s grant for execution be lifted by virtue of its authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases provided by B.P. Blg. 697. The said resolution was challenged by the petitioner questioning the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec to decide over the issue.
I: WON Comelec has the appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.
R: The court pointed out that the previous ruling on Garcia v Uy, the comelec was found to have no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction. But the Comelec stated that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction which the court finds to be correct as there is no expressed repeal of the said provision. The court thereby abandons said ruling from the Garcia v Uy.Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner made an appeal after which the court already divested its jurisdiction over the case to the comelec therefore it could no longer validly act upon its motion. (Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal which is 5 days after upon receipt of the court decision. An appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal.)On repeal of a statute:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly.
Serrano v NLRC 5.04.00
F: Isettan, respondent in the case files a motion for reconsideration after it was ordered to pay petitioner full backwages from the day of its termination from work until it is determined that he has been terminated for an authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter decision that Serrano was illegally dismissed and ordered to be reinstated was reversed by the NLRC on ground that he was dismissed by “authorized causes” (redundancy) which does not requires the 30 day notice. It is only for reasons of “just cause” that an employee must be issued the notice to give them due process. Serrano petitioned for review, which the court ordered Isettan to pay Serrano full backwages until it is determined whether his termination from service is of authorized cause. Isettan’s arguments include: (1) failure to issue a 30 days written notice to Serrano is not a violation of the labor law since the petitioner accepted their form of notice of giving 30 days pay to their employees in lieu of giving the 30 days notice although the petitioner did not accept the payment; (2) that the 30 day pay is more advantageous than the 30 days notice; (3) in any event the new ruling of this case should be applied prospectively.
I; WON the labor law requirement of giving 30 days notice prior to termination may be offset to giving 30 days pay.
R: Art. 283 of the Labor Code intends that the 30 day notice is mandatory. Nothing in the law gives private respondent the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. Upon the contention of the respondent that the ruling of the case should only be applied prospectively, the court finds no compelling reason not to apply it immediately. Respondent relied on the previous rulings of case in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the new ruling should be applied prospectively and should not be applied on parties who relied on the old doctrine in good faith which is not applicable in this case.
Vitarich v NLRC 5.20.99
F: Vitarich terminated Recodo for failure to comply with the memo issued upon him involving issues on company policies on credit transactions and cash advances. Prior to his termination, the Head of Personnel of the company submitted a report of its investigation finding no just cause to terminate Recodo but Vitarich still terminated Recodo, who filed a case for illegal dismissal against them. The Labor Arbiter finds Recodo was illegally dismissed but his findings were set aside by the NLRC ruling otherwise. Upon appeal of Recodo, the NLRC reversed its decision admitting some flaws on its decision. Vitarich contends that such decision of the NLRC is a grave abuse of its discretionary powers.
I; WON NLRC abused its discretionary power.
R: The court held that with its findings, although there is truth in the delayed implementation of the memo order to Recodo, such delay does not constitutes disobedience to merit the cause of his termination on grounds of loss of trust and confidence of the company upon him. In the name of social justice policy on labor, there must be sufficient grounds that the employer must prove when terminating its employees. This very norm of social justice demands the presumption of good faith credited to the employees in the performance of their duties upon failure of their employer to prove just cause for their dismissal. It is in obedience of this social policy mandate that the NLRC finds itself bound to reverse its first decision. Court re-affirmed the NLRC decision.
Astraquillo v Javier 13 SCRA 125 (1965)
F: The trial court decide in favor of the respondent declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordered the petitioners to pay respondents with unpaid rentals and damages. On appeal by the petitioners, it was assailed by the respondent that it is incomplete and defective thus the court said to wait until the appeal is perfected. For the meantime respondent moved for the writ of execution pending appeal due to the insolvency of the petitioners. The trial court granted the writ of execution which the petitioners appealed before the CA by petition for certiorari. CA ruled in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal of the respondent it reversed its decision upholding the decision of the CA. Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of CA on reversing its decision when the respondents did not raised any new issues to make it reverse its decision.
I: WON the CA erred in reversing its decision
R: No. it did not err in its decision to uphold the writ of execution pending appeal in court. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides the discretionary power of the trial court to grant or deny a motion ad the appellate courts will not interfere or modify or control such discretion unless there is an abuse thereof. The trial court has found the substantial claim in the case at bar and the appellate court affirmed this in its disputed resolution. There is no merit on the contention of the petitioner that the CA lacks substantial reason to reverse its decision. Courts have the power to amend and control its orders and processes to make them conform to law and justice. The SC finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA to uphold the writ of execution decided upon by the lower court.
Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools 219 SCRA 256
F: Petitioners are children who were expelled by the respondent from school on grounds for refusal to participate in the flag ceremony in violation of RA 1265 penalizing educational institution that refuses to perform flag ceremony. Petitioners belong to the sect of Jehova’s witness and participating to the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge is against their religious belief as it amounts to idolatry. Respondent contends that his action is in accordance with the Gerona
case where the court upholds that the flag is a symbol of the RP that symbolizes its sovereignty, freedom and liberty which does not involve any religious ceremony and that the determination of certain ritual is religious or not rests upon the court to decide.
I: WON the expulsion of the children from school is valid.
R: No, since the Gerona case was re-examined by the court and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag ceremony undermines one’s constitutional rights specifically the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.
The court cites the 2 fold aspect of religious freedom namely:
1. The absolute freedom to believe within the realm of thoughts
2. the freedom to act on one’s belief which may be regulatedIt underscores that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger , both grave and imminent which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the court held there is no clear and present danger to society with the refusal of the petitioner’s children to participate in the flag ceremony.
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