Arbiter - One who has the power to judge or ordain at will
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v Ignacio M. Capulong GR No. 82398 4.29.88
F: Petitioner is filming a motion picture about the EDSA Revolution and informed Juan Ponce Enrile about it who opposes the project and filed a temporary restraining order. Petitioner files motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action since the mini-series had not yet been completed. The court allowed the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on the respondent. In his reply, Enrile is invoking his right to privacy.
I: WON the production of the mini-series would be an intrusion to the privacy of Enrile.
R: No, the court held there is nothing in the film that constitutes an unlawful intrusion on the respondent’s life and it could not see any danger such poses into the privacy of respondent. The court held the film is of historical value and involves public domain and is an appropriate subject on freedom of speech and expression. It further cite the fact that Enrile is a public figure and being a part of the film is one of the natural consequence of being such and it is limited only to his character as a public officer and does not extend to his family in general.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v Philippine Blooming Mills 51 SCRA 189
F: petitioners staged a mass demonstration before the Malacanang Palace expressing their grievance against the abuses of the Pasig police. Their employer, herein respondent called for a meeting with the petitioner appealing to go back to work as it could hamper their operation of business and it is against the “no strike, no lockout” clause of their collective bargaining agreement. Petitioners assert they are not performing a strike but an exercise of the laborer’s constitutional right to freedom of expression. A second mtng. was called by respondent to urge the petitioners to report to work otherwise they will be dismissed from work. Petitioners did not grant the request of the respondent who consequently dismissed the officials of petitioners on grounds for violation of their CBA. The court ruled in favor of respondents hence this petition for review.
I: WON there is justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners
R: Workers acted right in the exercise of their freedom to expression. The petitioners explained to the company that such is what they are trying to assert thus it is not violative of their agreement on “no strike, no lockout” rule. The company’s right to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The company’s loss of unrealized profits for the day of the strike is not as important as the workers fight their rights. In fact, they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for that day. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in the denial of a person’s constitutional right, the CIR should not have denied their motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the court divested itself of their jurisdiction which renders their decision in favor of thecompany null and void.The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a morestringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVILWHICH THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT.When a Court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice requires it.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT 68 PHIL 12 MAY 5, 1939
Facts: Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, was accused for possessing one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Issue: The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of thelaws;(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution;and(3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.
R:1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.2. Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.
Due process of law means simply:(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government;(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.Thus a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; orproperty used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the Property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.3. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote, the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity, is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up- and-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and inAmerica . Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine.In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v CA GR No. 97336 2.19.93
F: Petitioner, an exchange student in the Philippines, promised the private respondent to marry her and asked that they will live together. After taking her virginity, the petitioner began to change his behavior and have become violent. He confessed that he is already married to someone else which prompted the private respondent to file a case against petitioner for damages due to breach of promise to marry under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code. The court decided in her favor in the account of the deceitful promise of the petitioner and that the parents of the respondent spent money for the preparation of the marriage. On appeal the CA affirmed lower court decision thus this petition.
I: WON the private respondent may sue under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
R: The court held that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. There was a deliberate omission of the provision that makes it so by the congress but in the interest of justice it incorporates in the Civil Code Art. 23 which provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Article 21 is designed to expand the concepts of torts or quasi-delict and fills the vaccum by adding legal remedy for the untold numbers of moral wrongs without which some injurious acts would be beyond redress. The private respondent therefore may claim for damages not by breach of promise to marry but because of the fraudulent and deceitful act of the petitioner that injures her honor and dignity.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v Ignacio M. Capulong GR No. 82398 4.29.88
F: Petitioner is filming a motion picture about the EDSA Revolution and informed Juan Ponce Enrile about it who opposes the project and filed a temporary restraining order. Petitioner files motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action since the mini-series had not yet been completed. The court allowed the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on the respondent. In his reply, Enrile is invoking his right to privacy.
I: WON the production of the mini-series would be an intrusion to the privacy of Enrile.
R: No, the court held there is nothing in the film that constitutes an unlawful intrusion on the respondent’s life and it could not see any danger such poses into the privacy of respondent. The court held the film is of historical value and involves public domain and is an appropriate subject on freedom of speech and expression. It further cite the fact that Enrile is a public figure and being a part of the film is one of the natural consequence of being such and it is limited only to his character as a public officer and does not extend to his family in general.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v Philippine Blooming Mills 51 SCRA 189
F: petitioners staged a mass demonstration before the Malacanang Palace expressing their grievance against the abuses of the Pasig police. Their employer, herein respondent called for a meeting with the petitioner appealing to go back to work as it could hamper their operation of business and it is against the “no strike, no lockout” clause of their collective bargaining agreement. Petitioners assert they are not performing a strike but an exercise of the laborer’s constitutional right to freedom of expression. A second mtng. was called by respondent to urge the petitioners to report to work otherwise they will be dismissed from work. Petitioners did not grant the request of the respondent who consequently dismissed the officials of petitioners on grounds for violation of their CBA. The court ruled in favor of respondents hence this petition for review.
I: WON there is justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners
R: Workers acted right in the exercise of their freedom to expression. The petitioners explained to the company that such is what they are trying to assert thus it is not violative of their agreement on “no strike, no lockout” rule. The company’s right to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The company’s loss of unrealized profits for the day of the strike is not as important as the workers fight their rights. In fact, they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for that day. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in the denial of a person’s constitutional right, the CIR should not have denied their motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the court divested itself of their jurisdiction which renders their decision in favor of thecompany null and void.The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a morestringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVILWHICH THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT.When a Court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice requires it.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT 68 PHIL 12 MAY 5, 1939
Facts: Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, was accused for possessing one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Issue: The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of thelaws;(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution;and(3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.
R:1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.2. Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.
Due process of law means simply:(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government;(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.Thus a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; orproperty used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the Property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.3. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote, the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity, is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up- and-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and inAmerica . Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine.In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v CA GR No. 97336 2.19.93
F: Petitioner, an exchange student in the Philippines, promised the private respondent to marry her and asked that they will live together. After taking her virginity, the petitioner began to change his behavior and have become violent. He confessed that he is already married to someone else which prompted the private respondent to file a case against petitioner for damages due to breach of promise to marry under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code. The court decided in her favor in the account of the deceitful promise of the petitioner and that the parents of the respondent spent money for the preparation of the marriage. On appeal the CA affirmed lower court decision thus this petition.
I: WON the private respondent may sue under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
R: The court held that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. There was a deliberate omission of the provision that makes it so by the congress but in the interest of justice it incorporates in the Civil Code Art. 23 which provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Article 21 is designed to expand the concepts of torts or quasi-delict and fills the vaccum by adding legal remedy for the untold numbers of moral wrongs without which some injurious acts would be beyond redress. The private respondent therefore may claim for damages not by breach of promise to marry but because of the fraudulent and deceitful act of the petitioner that injures her honor and dignity.
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